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SECRETARY PROBLEM WITH QUALITY-BASED PAYOFF
PABLO BLANC, JUAN PABLO BORTHAGARAY, DANIEL KOHEN,
AND MARTI´N MEREB
Abstract. We consider a variant of the classical Secretary Problem. In this
setting, the candidates are ranked according to some exchangeable random
variable and the quest is to maximize the expected quality of the chosen as-
pirant. We find an upper bound for the optimal hiring rule, present examples
showing it is sharp, and recover the classical case, among other results.
Introduction
A recruiter is faced with the task of selecting the best assistant among a stream
of n applicants, on a reject-or-hire basis. Namely, the decision is made right after
the interview, there is no coming back once a candidate is rejected, and all the
information gathered during the interview is whether the current postulant is or
not better than all its precursors. The best strategy for the interviewer implies
establishing a threshold index and selecting the first candidate that arrives after
such a point and is the best the recruiter has interviewed so far. In the classical
Secretary Problem the question is to find the optimal threshold index, provided
that we want to maximize the probability of hiring the best aspirant.
In this nice introductory example of a statistical decision making problem one
learns that the best strategy is to blindly reject the first ≈ n/e candidates and
from that point on, to select the first postulant that is superior than all of the
previous ones. If none is chosen with this plan, one just hires the last applicant.
We consider n, the total number of candidates, as a known quantity, that all of
them are totally ranked with no ties, the recruiter is only allowed to determine if
the current aspirant is the best that has arrived so far, and that the order in which
applicants arrive is random.
For a historical overview of this problem, some generalizations, and a conjecture
about Kepler’s choice of his second wife, see the interesting article by Ferguson [6].
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the first published solution of the classical
Secretary problem is due to Lindley [10]; the problem of minimizing the expected
rank of the candidate selected was studied by Chow et al. [4].
One of the first variants analyzed in the literature is the full-information problem,
i.e., when the recruiter is able to gather information about the distribution and
value of the candidates. This problem was solved by Gilbert and Mosteller [8].
Interestingly, the problem of minimizing the expected rank of the selected candidate
with full information –known as the Robbins’ problem– remains open. Nonetheless,
some bounds for this fully history-dependent problem are known; see [3].
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Among other well-known variants of the classical Secretary Problem there is
the Post-doc Problem [14], under the assumption that success is achieved when
the selected applicant is the second best, (considering that the best one will go to
Harvard anyway); the Problem of admitting a Class of Students, instead of only
one, from an aspirant pool, in which the task is to find a subset of candidates all
of them better ranked than all the rejected ones in an on-line algorithm [13]; and
the Problem of selecting the best k secretaries out of n with a similar method [9].
The Odds-theorem [2] provides another framework in which the classical Secretary
Problem may be solved and also allows to handle with group interviews [11], [12].
In the present article we tackle a variant of the Secretary Problem in which
the goal is to maximize the expected value of the quality of the selected applicant.
Bearden [1] proves that the optimal threshold index for independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) uniform random variables is close to
√
n.
As a by-product of a fruitful discussion after a talk about the work of Bearden,
we consider different distributions and prove that, in general, the optimal thresh-
old index c∗(n) is essentially bounded from above by n/e (see Theorem 2.1 below
for details). We provide several examples for both continuous and discrete distri-
butions, and study the behavior of the optimal threshold index in each situation.
Among these examples, we recover the classical Secretary Problem (Example 4.5)
and show that the bound from Theorem 2.1 is sharp (see examples 4.3, 4.5 and
4.6). We also prove that the order statistics form a complete monotonic sequence.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we give the general setting of
the problem, and define the optimal threshold index as well, in Section 2 we state
and prove the main result, namely the upper bound of the optimal stopping rule
regardless of the distribution chosen (Theorem 2.1). Afterwards, in Section 3, we
study the behavior of c∗(n) as n → ∞, and finally in Section 4 we provide several
examples as Exponential, Normal, Pareto distributions, together with permutations
and Bernoulli variables, and explain how to recover the classical problem from our
framework.
This work was originated in the inconspicuous “2038−seminar” which provided
an excellent work atmosphere. The authors want to thank IMAS-CONICET and
DM-FCEyN-UBA for their support. Special gratitude is due to their secretaries
and the people who hired them as well, since they seemed to have been aware of
these results beforehand.
1. Description of the problem
In this paper, we consider the following variant of the secretary problem. A
recruiter wants to hire an assistant among n candidates, under these conditions:
• The qualifications of the applicants are given by exchangeable random vari-
ables (Xk)k=1,...,n with finite expected value.
• The recruiter is a priori aware of their joint distribution.
• The candidates start arriving to the interview, one by one, and the only
information the recruiter is able to gather is whether the current applicant
is the best one evaluated so far. In particular, the interviewer is not aware
of the candidate’s actual quality.
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• Once the interview is finished, the recruiter has to choose whether rejecting
or hiring the applicant. If an applicant is rejected, it is not possible to recall
them later.
• The goal of the recruiter is to maximize the expected quality of the chosen
candidate.
Remark 1.1. It is necessary to define properly what happens if the current appli-
cant is as good as the most qualified interviewed by then. To this end, we rank the
candidates by quality, break ties at random and regard a candidate as unsurpassed
thus far if he or she is the best one according to this rank.
Our first goal is to characterize the possible optimal strategies for the recruiter.
First, note that if a candidate is not the best qualified on arrival, their expected
value given that information is lower than the expected value of a randomly chosen
applicant. Hence, any optimal strategy should only consider selecting a candidate
if it is the best so far (except for the last one which we are forced to hire).
Let us define
µk := E[Xk|Xk = max{X1, . . . , Xk}]
and
µ := E[Xk].
These values are well defined and are finite since the random variables are assumed
to be identically distributed and to have finite expected value. Moreover, since the
variables are exchangeable, µk = E[max{X1, . . . , Xk}] and thus µk+1 ≥ µk.
The following result shows that the possible optimal strategies for the recruiter
follow the same pattern as in the classical Secretary Problem [10, p.48] (and most
of its variants).
Proposition 1.2. The optimal strategy for the recruiter consists of choosing an
adequate c ∈ {1, . . . , n}, to blindly reject the first c − 1 candidates and from that
point on to hire a candidate if, when it comes to the interview, it is the best so far.
Proof. Let νk be the expected value of the candidate optimally chosen given that
we rejected the first k candidates. We have that νk+1 ≤ νk . Recall that a candidate
should only be considered if it is the best so far at arrival. Given that the k-th
candidate is the best so far, the recruiter should hire him only if µk ≥ νk. Observe
that µn−1 ≥ µ1 = νn−1 and hence the set of values such that µk ≥ νk is not empty.
Since µk is increasing in k and νk is decreasing, µk ≥ νk implies µk+1 ≥ νk+1.
Thus the recruiter should follow the strategy described in the statement for c =
min{k : µk ≥ νk}. 
Let Vn(c) be the expected value of the hired candidate when following the strat-
egy described in the proposition. Our goal is to maximize this quantity among all
possible values of c. We define the optimal threshold index c∗(n), as the smallest
value of c that maximizes Vn(c). Hence, the optimal strategy for the recruiter con-
sists of blindly rejecting the first c∗(n) − 1 candidates and from that point on to
hire a candidate if, when it comes to the interview, it is the best so far.
In order to find the optimal threshold index, we compute the expected value
Vn(c) of the hired candidate for each value of c as follows. We set Vn(1) := E[X1],
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and given c ≥ 2 we set
(1.1) Vn(c) =
n−1∑
k=c
µk
c− 1
k − 1
1
k
+
c− 1
n− 1µ.
Indeed, we are summing the expected value for the k-th applicant (provided it
surpasses all the former ones) times the probability of being selected, and including
at the end of this formula the case in which the recruiter hires the last one. Observe
that the k-th candidate is selected if and only if the best one among the first k− 1
is in the group of the first c−1 applicants and the k-th is superior to its precursors.
The discrete derivative of Vn, defined by the forward difference, has the following
expression
(1.2) ∆Vn(c) := Vn(c+ 1)− Vn(c) =
n−1∑
k=c+1
µk
k(k − 1) −
µc
c
+
µ
n− 1
valid for c ≥ 1. We aim to find an expression for Vn(c + 1) − Vn(c) suitable for
algebraic manipulations. In order to do so, let us recall the summation by parts
formula
n∑
k=m
fk(gk+1 − gk) = [fn+1gn+1 − fmgm]−
n∑
k=m
gk+1(fk+1 − fk).
This enables us to rewrite (1.2) as
(1.3) ∆Vn(c) =
n−1∑
k=c
µk+1 − µk
k
− µn − µ1
n− 1 .
Therefore, the discrete second derivative of Vn becomes
∆2Vn(c) := Vn(c+ 2)− 2Vn(c+ 1) + Vn(c) = −µc+1 − µc
c
≤ 0.
The last inequality holds because µk ≤ µk+1 for every k. This proves that Vn
is concave in c and therefore, local maxima are automatically global maxima. In
conclusion, the desired c is the first one that satisfies ∆Vn(c) ≤ 0 and ∆Vn(c−1) ≥
0. We summarize the preceding discussion in the following proposition.
Proposition 1.3. The optimal threshold index for n secretaries satisfies
c∗(n) := min{c ≥ 1: ∆Vn(c) ≤ 0}.
Remark 1.4. It could be the case that there exists more than one c maximizing
Vn(c). Consequently, whenever we set an upper bound for the threshold index
we are stating that there exists a c in the set of maximizers of Vn that is less or
equal than the bound, and whenever we provide a lower bound, it means that every
maximizer is greater or equal than the bound.
Setting c∗ as the lowest possible is natural when considering the problem from
the point of view of the recruiter, who is seeking to maximize the quality of the
selected candidate and not to perform too many interviews.
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2. Main theorem
After having defined the optimal threshold index, the reader may ask him-
self about the dependence of c∗(n) on the distribution of the random variables
(Xk)k=1,...,n. It is well known that for the classical Secretary Problem the optimal
threshold index is given by n/e. We claim that this number is an upper bound for
c∗(n), regardless of the distributions (Xk)k=1,...,n of the candidates. More precisely,
in this Section we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2.1. Given any set of exchangeable random variables (Xk)k=1,...,n, the
optimal threshold index c∗(n) satisfies
(2.1)
n−1∑
k=c∗(n)−1
1
k
> 1.
In particular, the bound c∗(n) . n/e holds.
In order to prove the previous theorem, let us define
µk:n := E[Xk|X1 ≤ · · · ≤ Xn].
Since the random variables under consideration are exchangeable, it is clear that
µk = µk:k. Given the sequence (µk)k=1,...,n, consider the discrete derivatives
∆µk = ∆
1µk = µk+1 − µk,
and in general
∆jµk = ∆
j−1µk+1 −∆j−1µk.
Straightforward computations lead to the identity
∆jµk =
j∑
i=0
µk+i
(
j
i
)
(−1)j−i =
k+j∑
i=k
µi
(
j
i− k
)
(−1)j−(i−k), if k + j ≤ n.(2.2)
Now we prove the complete monotonicity of the order statistics.
Proposition 2.2. Let k, j ≥ 0 be such that k + j ≤ n, then the following formula
holds:
∆jµk =
(
k + j
j
)−1
(−1)j+1 (µk+1:k+j − µk:k+j) .
Proof. If we consider exchangeable random variables (Xl)l=1,...,k+l, then every rel-
ative order between them is equally likely. By considering the possible ranks of the
top-ranked variable among the first i when taking into account the relative order
of all the variables, we obtain
µi =
(
k + j
i
)−1 k+j∑
l=i
µl:k+j
(
l − 1
i− 1
)
.
Next, we replace this expression on the right hand side of (2.2). After inter-
changing the order of summation and some algebraic manipulation, we obtain
∆jµk =
j!(−1)j
(k + j)!
k+j∑
l=k
µl:k+j(l − 1)!
l−k∑
i=0
(k + i)(−1)i
(l − k − i)!i! .(2.3)
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Let us recall that
t∑
i=0
(−1)i
(
t
i
)
= δt and
t∑
i=0
i(−1)i
(
t
i
)
= −δt−1.
Therefore, the last summation of (2.3) becomes
l−k∑
i=0
(k + i)(−1)i
(l − k − i)!i! =
1
(l − k)!
(
k
l−k∑
i=0
(−1)i
(
l − k
i
)
+
l−k∑
i=0
i(−1)i
(
l − k
i
))
=
1
(l − k)! (kδl−k − δl−k−1) .
Plugging this last expression into (2.3) we get
∆jµk =
j!(−1)j
(k + j)!
(µk:k+j(k − 1)!k − µk+1:k+jk!) ,
from which the result follows. 
An immediate consequence of the previous proposition is the following.
Corollary 2.3. Let j + k ≤ n. Then, ∆jµk ≥ 0 if j is odd and ∆jµk ≤ 0 if j is
even.
Considering j = 1 in Corollary 2.3, we obtain the elementary result that the
sequence (µk)k=1...n is increasing. Moreover, setting j = 2 we conclude:
Corollary 2.4. The sequence (µk+1 − µk)k=1...n−1 is decreasing.
At this point we are ready to provide a proof of our main result.
Proof of Theorem 2.1. Replacing µn − µ1 by
n−1∑
k=1
µk+1 − µk
in (1.3) gives
∆Vn(c) =
n−1∑
k=c
(µk+1 − µk)
(
1
k
− 1
n− 1
)
+
c−1∑
k=1
(µk+1 − µk)
( −1
n− 1
)
,
whose right hand side is not greater than
n−1∑
k=c
(µc+1 − µc)
(
1
k
− 1
n− 1
)
+
c−1∑
k=1
(µc+1 − µc)
( −1
n− 1
)
,
from which we conclude
∆Vn(c) ≤ (µc+1 − µc)
(
n−1∑
k=c
1
k
− 1
)
.
Then, ∆Vn(c) ≤ 0 when
n−1∑
k=c
1
k
≤ 1,
which proves that c∗(n) satisfies property (2.1). 
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Remark 2.5. The upper bound given by (2.1) is sharp, see examples 4.3, 4.5 and
4.6 below. On the other hand, there are no non-trivial lower bounds for the optimal
threshold index valid in general for any i.i.d. random variables. The idea behind
this fact is that if almost every candidate has maximal quality, then the recruiter has
no need to wait. We refer to Example 4.6 and Remark 4.7 for a simple construction
in which the optimal threshold index is c∗ = 2 for any number of applicants.
3. Asymptotic results for independent variables
Throughout this section we make the further assumption that for each n the
random variables (Xk)1≤k≤n are independent with a given distribution. We disre-
gard the case of a Dirac delta distribution in which all the candidates are equally
suitable, and thus every strategy furnishes the same result.
In this setting it is interesting to study the behavior of c∗(n) as n varies. We
prove that c∗ is a non-decreasing function of n that diverges as n goes to infinity.
This means that the recruiter has to wait longer as n grows and that c∗(n) becomes
as large as wanted. Namely, given any m ≥ 1, the interviewer would have to reject
the first m candidates if n (the total number of applicants) is taken large enough.
In the classical case, this is a straightforward consequence of the odds-theorem and
the odds-algorithm from [2]. Our approach is elementary in nature.
Proposition 3.1. The optimal threshold index grows with the amount of candi-
dates, that is, c∗(n) ≤ c∗(n+ 1).
Proof. Given c < c∗(n), using (1.3) we obtain
0 < ∆Vn(c) =
n−1∑
k=c
µk+1 − µk
k
− µn − µ1
n− 1 .
Employing again (1.3), now for c and n+ 1 we obtain
∆Vn+1(c) = ∆Vn(c) +
µn+1 − µn
n
+
µn − µ1
n− 1 −
µn+1 − µ1
n
= ∆Vn(c) +
µn − µ1
n(n− 1) > 0.
Then, ∆Vn+1(c) > 0, so c < c∗(n+ 1), implying that c∗(n) ≤ c∗(n+ 1) as claimed.

Lemma 3.2. The sequence (µk)
∞
k=1 is strictly increasing.
Proof. If the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the variables is F (x),
then the CDF of the maximum of k is F k(x). Therefore,
µk+1 − µk =
∫ ∞
−∞
x d(−F k(x)(1 − F (x))).
Integrating by parts the last expression we obtain
µk+1 − µk =
∫ ∞
−∞
F (x)k(1 − F (x))dx
with boundary terms vanishing thanks to the Lemma on page 37 of [5].
Since the variables are not Deltas, the last integral is positive and the result
follows. 
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Remark 3.3. The point of interest in the previous lemma is that not only is the
sequence (µk)
∞
k=1 monotone, but it is strictly increasing. To obtain this result, we
require the random variables to be independent. For example, if we consider a set
of n applicants where j are valued 0 and n− j are valued 1, then µk = 1 for every
k ≥ j + 1.
Proposition 3.4. The optimal threshold index diverges with the number of candi-
dates, that is, c∗(n)→∞ when n→∞.
Proof. Let c > 0 be fixed. From (1.2), we have
∆Vn(c) ≥ µc
c(c+ 1)
+ µc+1
n−1∑
k=c+2
1
k(k − 1) −
µc
c
+
µ1
n− 1
=
µc+1 − µc
c+ 1
− µc+1 − µ1
n− 1 .
Lemma 3.2 ensures that the first term above is strictly positive, while the last one
tends to 0 as n tends to infinity, and so the derivative at c is strictly positive for n
large enough. 
4. Examples
In this section we work through different families of distributions. The problem
of finding the optimal threshold index is invariant under linear scalings of the ap-
plicants’ qualities. For this reason the mean and variance of the random variables
under consideration play no role in the estimates we provide.
In §4.1 we deal with some continuous distributions (Exponential, Normal and
Pareto), and manage to prove that the upper bound from Theorem 2.1 is asymp-
totically optimal in a precise sense. In §4.2 we work out some discrete examples,
recover the solution of the classical Secretary Problem and exhibit an example that
shows that there is no non-trivial lower estimate for c∗(n).
Plots of several of the examples considered, both for continuous and discrete
distributions, are displayed in Figure 1. These illustrate the different behaviors
c∗(n) may exhibit.
4.1. Continuous i.i.d. random variables. Next we give three examples of i.i.d.
continuous random variables that will suggest that ‘the heavier the weight of the
tails, the longer the recruiter has to wait’. Let us recall that for uniform distribu-
tions it holds that c∗(n) ∼
√
n (cf. [1]); here we provide other examples of interest.
Example 4.1 (Exponential distribution). Let the candidates’ values be given by
independent exponential distributions, Xk ∼ exp(1). It is easy to verify that
µk =
k∑
j=1
1
j
,
thus,
µk+1 − µk = 1
k + 1
.
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(a) Exponential distribution. (b) Pareto distribution.
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(c) Classical problem.
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
c
V n
(c)
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
c
V n
(c)
(d) Bernoulli distribution with (1− p)n
close to α ≥ 0.
(e) Bernoulli distribution with large values
of (1− p)n.
Figure 1. Plots of Vn as a function of c for different distributions
with n = 10000. The maxima are highlighted. (a) In example 4.1,
the maximum is attained at c = 1022, whereas nlog(n)+γ ∼ 1021.7.
(b) Example 4.3, with α = 1.5 (black) and α = 1 + 10−10 (blue),
normalized in order to make Vn(c∗) = 1. The points where the
maxima are attained approach to n/e as α tends to 1. (c) In
Example 4.5, the optimal threshold index is c = 3680 ∼ n/e. Plots
(d) and (e) are taken from Example 4.6. (d) The colors correspond
to p = 1− 2/n (black), p = 1− 1/n (blue) and p = 1− 0.1/n (red).
The points where the maxima are attained approach to n/e as p
tends to 1. (e) Plots for p = 0.1 (black) and p = 0.99 (blue). The
points where the maxima are attained tend to 2 as p→ 0.
10 BLANC, BORTHAGARAY, KOHEN, AND MEREB
Therefore, formula (1.3) becomes
∆Vn(c) =
n−1∑
k=c
1
k(k + 1)
−
∑n
k=1
1
k − 1
n− 1
=
1
c
− 1
n
+
1
n− 1 −
∑n−1
i=1
1
i
n− 1 .
From this last equation it is straightforward to check that
c∗(n) ∼ n
log(n) + γ
where
γ = lim
n
n∑
k=1
1
k
− logn
is the Euler-Mascheroni constant. Indeed, setting ∆Vn(c) ≤ 0, we immediately
bound
0 >
1
c
−
∑n−1
i=1
1
i
n− 1 ,
so that
c >
n− 1∑n−1
i=1
1
i
from which
c∗(n) >
⌊
n− 1∑n−1
i=1
1
i
⌋
.
The bound
c∗(n) <
⌈
n∑n
i=1
1
i
⌉
follows similarly.
Example 4.2 (Normal distribution). Assume the aspirants’ qualities are given by
a distribution N(0, 1). Then, the expected value of the maximum among the first
k applicants satisfies
µ2k = log
(
k2
2π
)
− log log
(
k2
2π
)
+ f(k),
where f is a function such that limk→∞ f(k) = 4γ (see [5, Ex. 10.5.3]). Therefore,
if k is large enough,
(4.1) log
(
k2
2π
)
− log log
(
k2
2π
)
≤ µ2k ≤ log
(
k2
2π
)
.
This last inequality allows us to obtain an upper bound for the optimal threshold
index. Recall that, due to Proposition 3.4, c∗(n)→∞ as n→∞.
Resorting to (4.1) we write
µc∆Vn(c) ≤
n−1∑
k=c+1
µ2k
k(k − 1) −
µ2c
c
≤
n−1∑
k=c+1
log
(
k2
2π
)
k(k − 1) −
log
(
c2
2π
)
c
+
log log
(
c2
2π
)
c
.
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Observe that
n−1∑
k=c+1
log
(
k2
2π
)
k(k − 1) ≤
∫ n−1
c
log
(
t2
2π
)
(t− 1)2 dt,
whose right hand side equals to
log
(
c2
2π
)
c− 1 + 2 log
(
c
c− 1
)
−
log
(
(n−1)2
2π
)
n− 2 − 2 log
(
n− 1
n− 2
)
.
Thus, since
log
(
c2
2π
)
c
< 1 and log
(
c
c− 1
)
<
1
c− 1 ,
we bound
µc∆Vn(c) ≤
≤ 2 log
(
c
c− 1
)
+
log
(
c2
2π
)
c(c− 1) +
log log
(
c2
2π
)
c
−
log
(
(n−1)2
2π
)
n− 2 − 2 log
(
n− 1
n− 2
)
<
3 + log log
(
c2
2π
)
c− 1 −
log
(
(n−1)2
2π
)
n− 2 .
Finally, if we substitute c by
c˜ =
(n− 2) log logn
log
(
(n−1)2
2π
) + 1
in the expression above, we obtain
∆Vn(c˜) <
log
(
(n−1)2
2π
)
µc˜(n− 2)

3 + log log
(
c˜2
2π
)
log logn
− 1

 ≤ 0,
for n large enough. This provides an upper bound for the optimal threshold index,
namely
c∗(n) ≤ (n− 2) log logn
log
(
(n−1)2
2π
) + 1.
Example 4.3 (Pareto distribution). Consider (Xk)k=1,...,n i.i.d. Pareto distribu-
tions with CDF equal to F (x;α) = 1 − x−α for x ≥ 1, where α > 1. In this case
we have [5, pg. 52] that
µk =
Γ
(
1− 1α
)
Γ(k + 1)
Γ
(
k + 1− 1α
) .
In [7] it is proved the estimates
(k + 1)
1
α ≥ Γ(k + 1)
Γ
(
k + 1− 1α
) ≥ k 1α .
Recall that Γ(x+ 1) = xΓ(x), and so
µk+1 − µk = µk+1
α(k + 1)
≥ Γ
(
1− 1α
)
(k + 1)
1
α
−1
α
.
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Thus, taking into account (1.3), we obtain
∆Vn(c) ≥ Γ
(
1− 1
α
)(
− (n+ 1)
1
α − 1
n− 1 +
n−1∑
k=c
(k + 1)
1
α
−2
α
)
≥ Γ
(
1− 1
α
)(
− (n+ 1)
1
α − 1
n− 1 +
1
α
∫ n+1
c+1
x
1
α
−2dx
)
.
Note that for fixed α, when n is large enough, we have the inequality
− (n+ 1)
1
α − 1
n− 1 ≥ −(n+ 1)
1
α
−1,
therefore we can write
∆Vn(c) ≥ Γ
(
1− 1
α
)(
(c+ 1)
1
α
−1 1
α− 1 − (n+ 1)
1
α
−1
(
1
α− 1 + 1
))
.
Thus, we obtain that if
n+ 1
c+ 1
≥ α αα−1
then ∆Vn(c) ≥ 0. This implies that
n+ 1
c∗(n) + 1
≤ α αα−1
whenever n large enough. Finally, note that this last term tends to e as α approaches
1, thus the bound of Theorem 2.1 is asymptotically sharp for the Pareto distribution
when α→ 1.
4.2. Discrete random variables. In this paragraph we study the behavior of
several discrete random variables. We also recover the solution of the classical
Secretary Problem and provide a family of examples for which, as certain parameter
varies, the threshold index c∗ exhibits both extremal behaviors, the linear one
limited by the upper bound from Theorem 2.1 and the constant one attained by
the minimum possible of c∗(n) = 2 (see Remark 4.7 below).
Example 4.4 (Permutations). If the candidates’ values (Xk)1≤k≤n are distributed
uniformly over the permutations of the numbers from 1 to n, these random variables
are exchangeable and satisfy
µk =
(
n
k
)−1 n∑
i=k
i
(
i− 1
k − 1
)
.
Since
n∑
i=k
i
(
i− 1
k − 1
)
= k
(
n+ 1
k + 1
)
,
we obtain the simpler expression
µk =
(
n
k
)−1
k
(
n+ 1
k + 1
)
=
k(n+ 1)
k + 1
,
and then conclude
µk+1 − µk = n+ 1
(k + 2)(k + 1)
.
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This, together with (1.3), allows us to estimate the discrete derivative of Vn,
∆Vn(c) =
n−1∑
k=c
n+ 1
k(k + 1)(k + 2)
− n−
n+1
2
n− 1
and hence
∆Vn(c) =
n2 + n− c2 − c
2c(c+ 1)n
− 1
2
=
n+ 1
2c(c+ 1)
− 1
2n
− 1
2
from which
c∗(n) =
⌊√
n+ 1/4 + 1/2
⌋
is easily obtained.
It is worth noting that this kind of behavior is expected, as this situation is a
discrete analogue of the uniform distribution. Even more, it can be deduced from
the considerations in [1] that
⌊√
n+ 1/4 + 1/2
⌋
is also the exact threshold index
in the uniform distribution case.
Example 4.5 (Recovering the classical Secretary Problem). Consider random vari-
ables (Xk)1≤k≤n in such a way that for each k, with probability 1/n it holds that Xk
is equal to 1 and the rest of them are equal to 0. This is equivalent to the classical
Secretary Problem since, in this case, maximizing the expected value corresponds to
maximizing the probability of selecting the best applicant. Since µk =
k
n , applying
equation (1.3) we obtain
∆Vn(c) =
1
n
(
n−1∑
k=c
1
k
− 1
)
,
Therefore, c∗(n) is the least integer c that satisfies
∑n−1
k=c
1
k ≤ 1, as in the classical
Secretary Problem.
Example 4.6 (Bernoulli variables). Assume the applicants’ qualities are given by
i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables Xk ∼ B(1, 1 − p), so that µk = 1 − pk. Recalling
formula (1.3), it follows that
∆Vn(c) =
n−1∑
k=c
pk − pk+1
k
− p− p
n
n− 1 = (1 − p)
n−1∑
k=c
pk
k
− p− p
n
n− 1 .
Since the function k 7→ pkk is decreasing, after a change of variables we obtain∫ 1
c/n
pnz
z
dz ≤
n−1∑
k=c
pk
k
≤
∫ 1
(c−1)/(n−1)
p(n−1)z
z
dz.
We study the behavior of the optimal threshold index in two different scenarios.
For this purpose, let us consider p = p(n) and define
f(n) := (1− p)n,
the expected number of candidates with quality Xk = 1. The two aforementioned
situations are distinguished by the asymptotic behavior of f(n) as n→∞.
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In first place, assume that limn f(n) = α ≥ 0 and perform calculations for
c = c(n). In such case, we have that limn p
n = e−α and
lim
n
p− pn
(n− 1)(1− p) =
{
1−e−α
α if α > 0,
1 if α = 0.
Let us call g(α) the function defined by the right hand side above. Then, given
ǫ > 0, if n is large enough we obtain
∆Vn(c)
1− p ≥
∫ 1
c/n
pnz
z
dz − g(α)− ǫ.
As the integral above is non convergent if the lower limit c/n is substituted by 0, if
c/n→ 0 we have ∆Vn(c) ≥ 0. This shows that the optimal threshold index is linear
in n. A lower bound may be obtained if c/n = β > 0, since due to the Dominated
Convergence Theorem,
lim
n
∫ 1
c/n
pnz
z
dz =
∫ 1
β
e−αz
z
dz.
Therefore,
∆Vn(nβ) ≥
∫ 1
β
e−αz
z
dz − g(α)− 2ǫ
if n is large enough. Taking β such that∫ 1
β
e−αz
z
dz = g(α),
we obtain a lower bound for c∗. For example, if α = 0 we recover the sharp bound
β = 1/e, and for α = 1 we obtain β ≃ 0.323.
On the other hand, assuming that limn f(n) =∞ it is possible to show that the
optimal threshold index is not linear in n. Indeed, simple calculations give
(4.2) ∆Vn(c) ≤ 1
n− c
∫ 1
(c−1)/(n−1)
[
(1− p)(n− c)p
(n−1)z
z
− p+ pn
]
dz.
Assume that there exists an ǫ > 0 such that (c−1)/(n−1) > ǫ. Then, the integrand
is easily shown to be negative for large n, because
(1−p)(n− c)p
(n−1)z
z
−p+pn ≤ p
[
(1− p)(n− c)(n− 1)pǫ(n−1)−1
c− 1 − 1 + p
n−1
]
≤ 0
for large n, because the term in brackets tends to −1 as n → ∞. This shows that
if c is linear in n, the derivative at c is negative. Thus, the optimal threshold index
is not linear in n.
Remark 4.7. This last example provides a family of situations for which there is
no lower bound for the optimal threshold index. Indeed, let us fix n and c > 2 and
consider the limit p→ 0. The integrand in the right hand side of(4.2) is pointwise
bounded above by
p
(
(1− p)(n− c)(n− 1)pc−2
c− 1 − 1 + p
n−1
)
,
and so it is negative for every z ∈ [(c − 1)/(n − 1), 1] if p is small enough. This
proves that ∆Vn(c) ≤ 0 for every n, c > 2 if p is small enough, and thus c∗ = 2.
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